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 This is an appeal under the formal procedure pursuant to 
G.L. c. 58A, § 7 and G.L. c. 62C, § 39 from the refusal of the 
Commissioner of Revenue (“Commissioner” or “appellee”), to abate 
income taxes owned by and assessed to the appellant, Christopher 
G. Libertini (“appellant”), for tax years ending December 31, 
2012 and December 31, 2013 (“tax years at issue”). 
 Commissioner Good heard this appeal. Chairman Hammond and 
Commissioners Scharaffa, Rose and Chmielinski joined her in the 
decision for the appellee.   
 These findings of fact and report are made pursuant to a 
request by the appellant under G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 CMR 
1.32.  
 
 Christopher G. Libertini, pro se, for the appellant. 
 
 Michael P. Clifford, Esq., for the appellee.   
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT 
On the basis of the testimony and exhibits offered into 
evidence at the hearing of this appeal, the Appellate Tax Board 
(“Board”) made the following findings of fact. 
On April 15, 2013, the appellant filed his 2012 Form 1, 
Massachusetts Resident Income Tax Return (“income tax return”).  
On April 15, 2014, the appellant filed his 2013 income tax 
return.  In February of 2015, the Commissioner commenced an 
audit of the appellant’s income tax returns for the tax years at 
issue.  After a hearing with the Department of Revenue Office of 
Appeals, the Commissioner determined that the appellant was not 
entitled to the employee business expense deductions that he had 
claimed on his income tax returns for the tax years at issue, 
but further determined that the appellant had established 
reasonable cause for the waiver of penalties.   
By Notice of Assessment (“NOA”) dated February 2, 2016, the 
Commissioner informed the appellant of the assessments of tax of 
$1,470 and interest of $179.53 for the 2012 tax year and of tax 
of $2,039 and interest of $159.61 for the 2013 tax year.  
Because the NOA also included tax and interest resulting from 
another tax issue that the parties have agreed not to contest 
before the Board, the amounts of tax in dispute are $1,458 for 
tax year 2012 and $2,023 for tax year 2013, together with 
associated interest.   
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On February 11, 2016, the appellant timely filed an 
abatement application with the Commissioner, which the 
Commissioner denied on May 31, 2016.  The appellant seasonably 
filed an appeal with the Board on July 20, 2016.  Based on the 
foregoing facts, the Board found and ruled that it had 
jurisdiction over the instant appeal. 
During the tax years at issue, the appellant lived with his 
wife and children at their home in Lowell, Massachusetts.  In 
August of 2006, the appellant began working as an Assistant 
Professor of History for Dominican College (“Dominican”) in 
Orangeburg, New York.  From August 2006 through the tax years at 
issue, Dominican offered, and the appellant accepted, 1-year 
contracts to teach at Dominican.  The contracts each covered the 
academic year of August 15
th
 through August 14
th
.  Each of the 
contracts for the tax years at issue were made by Dominican as 
of April 1
st
 of that calendar year, and signed by the appellant 
no later than April 25
th
 and by the President of Dominican no 
later than May 2
nd
 of the same calendar year.   
In August of 2006, the appellant purchased a condominium in 
Pomona, New York, located about 12 miles from Dominican.  The 
appellant owned the condominium during the tax years at issue, 
and he continued to own it at the time of the hearing of this 
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appeal.
1
 In both the Fall and Spring semesters during the tax 
years at issue, the appellant drove the 210-mile trip to 
Dominican from his home in Lowell, Massachusetts at the start of 
each week.  He stayed at his condominium in Pomona during the 
week, and drove back to Lowell at the end of each week so that 
he could spend his weekends in Lowell.   
On his Massachusetts personal income tax returns for each 
of the tax years at issue, the appellant deducted employee 
business expenses associated with traveling between his home in 
Lowell and his place of employment in Orangeburg.  Specifically, 
the appellant included deductions for mileage, tolls, meals, and 
lodging expenses, including amounts for mortgage interest, 
property tax, and condominium fees associated with the 
condominium in Pomona.  The Commissioner denied those expenses, 
determining that the appellant’s so-called “tax home” was in 
Orangeburg, New York, at his place of business, not in Lowell, 
Massachusetts, at his family’s home.  The Commissioner’s 
determination of the appellant’s tax home is the issue in this 
appeal. 
The appellant testified about his duties as Assistant 
Professor of History at Dominican.  He taught 4 courses each 
semester, including proctoring the final exams for each course.  
                                                 
1
 The appellant listed the condominium for sale on July 29, 2007, but he 
subsequently removed the listing on February 3, 2008.    
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In addition, the appellant served as an advisor to about 15 to 
20 students each semester, which involved reviewing the 
students’ programs of study, their degree requirements and their 
grades, and helping them register for upcoming classes.  The 
appellant also held regular office hours in order to consult 
with students in his classes as well as those whom he was 
advising.   
During the tax years at issue, the appellant also served as 
Coordinator of Dominican’s History Department.  He testified 
that in this capacity he did the following:  managed the history 
department staff, which included 2 full-time faculty members and 
4 to 5 part-time faculty members; designed course schedules for 
approximately 15 history courses per semester; and oversaw 
appeals filed by students who wished to dispute a grade or other 
matters within the history department.   
Lastly, during the tax years at issue, the appellant also 
served as coach of Dominican’s debate team, which involved 
meeting with the team for approximately 1.5 hours each week and 
taking them to tournaments 2 to 3 times per semester.  By the 
terms of his contract, the appellant was required to be on 
campus for a minimum of 20 hours each week during the Fall and 
Spring semesters, but he estimated that he was typically on 
campus for more than 20 hours each week.  The appellant also 
performed some of his work for Dominican off-site, at his 
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condominium in Pomona, such as preparing for classes, reviewing 
student work, responding to e-mails, and other administrative 
duties.   
The appellant testified that Dominican allowed professors 
to apply for tenure after they had completed 6 years of 
teaching, and he was in fact granted tenure in August of 2012, 
during the first of the 2 tax years at issue.  The appellant 
contended that, in contrast to the common notion of tenure as a 
near-guarantee of indefinite employment, he did not believe that 
tenure at Dominican provided the same guarantee, as evidenced by 
the fact that he was still required to enter into annual 
employment contracts with Dominican.
2
  The appellant testified 
that he understood tenure at Dominican to include a $1,500 
increase in base salary and an entitlement to serve on 2 
committees, the Hearing Committee and the Grievance Committee.   
The appellant also testified about the professional and 
personal reasons he chose to maintain his family home in 
Massachusetts rather than New York.  Regarding his professional 
reasons, the appellant served in the Army Reserve at Fort 
Devens, Massachusetts, a position that required him to report to 
Fort Devens for 1 weekend per month and 2 additional weeks 
during the Summer.  The appellant also served as an exam grader 
                                                 
2
 After he was awarded tenure, the appellant’s employment contracts identified 
him as an “Assistant Professor of History with Tenure.”   
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at Harvard Extension School, but he testified that this work 
could be performed remotely from any location and did not 
require him to be physically present at Harvard University.  
Finally, the appellant was a landlord of the multi-family home 
where he lived with his family.     
Regarding his personal reasons for remaining in 
Massachusetts, the appellant testified that he wished to spend 
time with his aging parents, who resided at his home in Lowell.  
He also felt a personal connection to Massachusetts, where he 
was born, raised and worked until he was hired by Dominican.  As 
he explained, “I’ve always just -- I like Massachusetts.” 
Based on the evidence, the Board found that the location of 
the appellant’s principal place of business was Orangeburg, New 
York, where Dominican was located.  The Board further found that 
the appellant did not establish that his position with 
Dominican, which began in 2006 and continued throughout and 
after the tax years at issue, was “temporary.”  The fact that 
the appellant purchased a condominium rather than choosing to 
rent belied his testimony that he believed his employment with 
Dominican to be temporary.  Therefore, as will be explained in 
the following Opinion, the Board found and ruled that the 
appellant’s tax home was Orangeburg, New York, not Lowell, 
Massachusetts.  The appellant thus was not entitled to take 
deductions for traveling expenses -– including mileage, tolls, 
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meals or lodging expenses –- associated with performing his work 
at Dominican. 
Accordingly, the Board issued a decision for the appellee 
upholding the assessments at issue. 
 
 
OPINION 
During the tax years at issue, G.L. c. 62, § 2(d)(2)      
(“§ 2(d)(2)”) allowed taxpayers to deduct from their gross 
income the following: 
[a]n amount equal to the deductions allowed by Part VI 
of the [Internal Revenue] Code [(“Code”)] which 
consist of expenses of travel, meals and lodging while 
away from home, or expenses of transportation paid or 
incurred by the taxpayer in connection with the 
performance by  him of services as an employee; . . . 
provided, however, . . . the deductions under clauses 
(i) and (ii) are allowed as itemized deductions under 
subsection (a) of section sixty-seven of the Code. 
 
Among the Code provisions referenced in § 2(d)(2) is            
§ 162(a)(2), which provides a deduction for “all the ordinary 
and necessary expenses” associated with “carrying on any trade 
or business,” including “traveling expenses,” specifically 
“meals” and “lodging” expenses that are expended “while away 
from home in pursuit of a trade or business.”  The issue in the 
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present appeal was whether the appellant was “away from home” 
when he incurred the expenses at issue.
3
  
The Board looked to Federal cases interpreting “away from 
home” as that term is used in Code § 162 (a)(2), because “if the 
State income tax law has incorporated Federal income tax 
provisions, those provisions should be interpreted as they are 
interpreted for Federal income tax purposes.”  Grady v. 
Commissioner of Revenue, 421 Mass. 374, 380 (1995) (other 
citations omitted).  “The reference to ‘home’ in section 
162(a)(2) means the taxpayer’s ‘tax home.’”  Roberts v. 
Commissioner, T.C. Summary Opinion 2011-127 (2011).   The Tax 
Court “has held as a general rule that the location of a 
taxpayer’s principal place of business is his tax home, not the 
location of a taxpayer’s personal residence.”  Id. (citing 
Mitchell v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 578, 581 (1980)).   
“The purpose of the section 162(a)(2) deduction is to 
mitigate the burden upon a taxpayer who, because of the 
exigencies of business, must maintain two places of abode and 
thereby incur additional living expenses.”  Andrews v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 931 F.2d 132, 135 (1st Cir. 
1991) (other citations omitted).  “[T]he exigencies of business” 
is the key concept here, because expenses for commuting to and 
                                                 
3
 The appellant did not challenge, and the Board did not address, the proper 
calculation of the appellant’s expenses. 
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from work are generally not deductible.  Fausner v. 
Commissioner, 413 U.S. 838, 839 (1973); see also Commissioner v. 
Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 474 (1946) (“The exigencies of business 
rather than the personal conveniences and necessities of the 
traveler must be the motivating factors” in determining 
deductibility of travel expenses.).  The 9
th
 Circuit in Coombs v. 
Commissioner, 608 F.2d 1269, 1275-76 (9th Cir. 1979) further 
explained the rationale behind that determination: 
When a taxpayer accepts employment either permanently 
or for an indefinite time away from the place of his 
usual abode, the taxpayer’s tax home will shift to the 
new location – the vicinity of the taxpayer’s new 
principal place of business.  In such circumstances, 
the decision to retain a former residence is a 
personal choice, and the expenses of traveling to and 
from that residence are non-deductible personal 
expenses.  
 
Id. at 584 n.7 (emphasis added).  Likewise, the Tax Court in 
Tucker v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 783 (1971) held that a teacher 
who maintained his family home in Tennessee while he worked at 
teaching positions in Georgia and North Carolina was not 
entitled to deduct his duplicate living expenses associated with 
maintaining the residences located closer to his jobs, because 
his decision to retain his family home in Tennessee was a 
personal choice, not one made for the exigencies of his 
business.  The Tax Court explained: 
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If a taxpayer chooses for personal reasons to maintain 
a family residence far from his principal place of 
employment, then his additional traveling and living 
expenses are incurred as a result of that personal 
choice, and are therefore not deductible.  Similarly, 
if a taxpayer accepts indefinite employment outside 
the city in which he lives, but he does not change his 
family residence, the travel to his new place of 
employment and the additional living costs which he 
incurs there result, not from his employment, but from 
his decision not to move his residence.  
 
Id. at 786.  See also Bogue v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2011-164 
(holding that, because the taxpayer’s decision of where to live 
is a personal choice, the expenses of commuting from home to 
work are not generally deductible as business expenses).   
 A notable exception to the bar against deducting commuting 
expenses is the deductibility of expenses incurred in traveling 
to a “temporary” work site, which the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue defines as one that “is realistically expected to last 
(and does in fact last) for 1 year or less.”  Rev. Rul. 99-7, 
1999-1 C.B. at 361.  By contrast, when a taxpayer’s employment 
is permanent or lasts for an indefinite period of time, it is 
not considered “temporary,” and the expenses associated with 
commuting to that job are therefore not deductible.  
In Commissioner v. Mitchell, 74 T.C. 578 (1980), the 
taxpayer, a hospital employee, transferred to a different 
hospital in Napa, located about 100 miles from his family home, 
when his previous hospital of employment closed.  Id. at 579.  
The taxpayer lived in a rented trailer during the work week and 
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he commuted to his family home on the weekends.  Id.  Based on 
the fact that, at the beginning of the tax periods, the taxpayer 
had worked for the hospital for approximately 2.5 years, that he 
continued to work there throughout the tax periods, and that 
“the record before us gives us no basis for concluding that [the 
taxpayer] foresaw, or could reasonably have been expected to 
foresee, termination of his employment,” the Tax Court concluded 
that the taxpayer’s employment did not qualify as “temporary.”  
Id. at 582.  Because his work was not temporary, the Tax Court 
concluded that the taxpayer’s “tax home” was Napa, where the 
hospital was located.   
In the instant appeal, the appellant argued that his 
employment with Dominican should not be considered permanent, 
because he must sign a new contract every year, even though he 
was awarded tenure.  However, the Board found that at the very 
least, the appellant’s employment with Dominican was 
“indefinite,” not “temporary,” because he “realistically 
expected” his employment to last – and it did “in fact last” – 
more than 1 year.  See Rev. Rul. 99-7.   
The evidence showed that the appellant began teaching at 
Dominican in 2006, and he was still teaching there at the time 
of the hearing of this appeal, in 2017. He was awarded tenure in 
2012, and his annual employment contracts were renewed each year 
thereafter, throughout the tax years at issue.  While the 
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appellant disputed the meaning of “tenure” as used by Dominican, 
there was no dispute that his yearly contracts starting in April 
2012 identified him as “Assistant Professor of History with 
Tenure.”  The evidence did not support the conclusion that the 
appellant had a reasonable basis to believe that Dominican would 
choose not to extend his employment at the college. When 
questioned by the hearing officer as to whether he was aware of 
any professors at Dominican whose annual contracts were not 
renewed, he testified that there had been faculty members who 
have left Dominican.  However, he could not point to any 
examples when the departure was involuntary.  Moreover, the 
Board found that the appellant’s own actions of purchasing a 
condominium, rather than renting a dwelling, strongly supported 
the conclusion that the appellant himself expected his 
employment at Dominican to last for more than 1 year. 
Accordingly, the Board found and ruled that the appellant’s 
employment with Dominican did not qualify as “temporary” and 
therefore, his additional traveling and living expenses related 
to maintaining his work home in Orangeburg were not deductible.   
The appellant further contended that he had business 
reasons for maintaining his family home in Lowell, and that 
these business reasons tipped the scale in favor of Lowell being 
his tax home.  These other positions were with Harvard Extension 
School, the Army Reserve, and as a landlord for his family home.  
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In Montgomery v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 175, 176 (1975), the 
taxpayer was a Michigan state legislator who performed his job 
in different locations, namely at the state capital in Lansing 
and at his constituent base in Detroit.  The Tax Court held 
that, when a taxpayer has more than one place of business, 
courts should inquire as to where “most of his work was 
performed” to determine the location of the principal place of 
business, and thus the tax home.  Id. at 176.  The facts of the 
instant appeal are slightly different from Montgomery, as the 
appellant performed 4 different jobs – his teaching job at 
Dominican; his Army Reserve job at Fort Devens; his grading job 
at Harvard Extension School; and being a landlord for his family 
home in Lowell.  However, the Board found that the Ford Devens, 
Harvard Extension School and landlord jobs were not the 
appellant’s main sources of income during the tax years at 
issue, nor did they occupy an equivalent amount of his time as 
compared with the appellant’s extensive work as a college 
professor for Dominican.  Moreover, the Harvard Extension School 
position was not even tied to a specific geographic location, as 
the appellant admitted that he performed this work remotely.  
The Board thus found and ruled that the appellant’s secondary 
jobs did not move the location of his tax home to Lowell.   
On the basis of all of the evidence, the Board found that 
the appellant’s main source of employment was his job with 
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Dominican, and that job was not temporary.  The Board further 
found that his decision not to move his family home was 
primarily personal.  The Board thus found and ruled that the 
appellant’s “tax home” was Orangeburg, New York.  Therefore, the 
Board found and ruled that the Commissioner properly denied the 
appellant’s deductions for expenses related to maintaining his 
tax home in New York. 
Accordingly, the Board issued a decision for the appellee 
in this appeal. 
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